Introduction
Organizations -private …rms, government agencies, and non-pro…t organizations -can be modeled as networks of agents who are working together toward a common set of goals. Arrow (1974) views organizations as ways to overcome the limits of individual agents. By bringing together multiple workers, organizations can perform tasks that are outside the reach of any individual. While this creates production opportunities it also poses a challenge. In order to be productive, workers must coordinate their actions. Often this requires communicating information that is dispersed throughout the organization.
However, we humans face cognitive limits: transmitting and absorbing information requires time and energy. Managers spend a considerable part of their work time communicating with other workers. Bandiera et al. (2011) report that over 80% of the work time of executive managers is spend in communication activities, such as meetings, phone conversations, events, conferences, etc. Mankins et al. (2014) …nd that senior executives devote more than two days every week to meetings involving three or more coworkers, and 15% of an organization's collective time is spent in meetings.
As Arrow (1974) noted, given the importance of communication both as an opportunity and as a cost, organizations will strive to optimize information ‡ows between workers. This leads to two important predictions in organizational economics. First, communication patterns within an organization will not be random but they will, at least in part, be shaped by the goals of the organization. Second, the cost of communication will be an important factor in designing the organization. Di¤erent organizational charts imply di¤erent information ‡ows and hence di¤erent costs. A number of scholars have developed and extended Arrow's (1974) insights into formal models. This literature forms a bridge between theories of rational inattention (Sims 2003) , whereby agents pay a price to transmit or receive information from other agents, and network economics, where typically links between agents are not explicitly stated in terms of information transmission and agents' payo¤s are not expressed in terms of actions to be taken with incomplete information. The term attention network appears appropriate for this type of models.
Attention networks are most closely related to the …eld of organizational economics (surveyed by Gibbons and Roberts 2013). Limits to attention play a crucial role in other theories in organizational economics such as Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and Garicano (2000) .
We focus here on an explicit network-theoretic approach, leaving a more general discussion to the survey of organizational economics with cognitive costs by Garicano and Prat (2013) .
Attention networks can be used to discuss a central theme of organizational economics: coordination. Organizations exist to coordinate specialized workers. As emphasized by Adam Smith, breaking up a production process in specialized tasks allows to dramatically increase productivity. But while the division of labor has resulted in huge productivity gains in modern economies, it also creates a need for coordination of specialized activities. The main role of organizational networks, therefore, is to achieve coordination in the presence of the division of labor. The key feature of attention networks in organizations -the one highlighted by Arrow (1974) -is further that they are endogenous. Attention networks in organizations are designed, shaped and optimized for the goal of coordination. Communication is costly, and the decision to invest in communication is made consciously by agents, either individually or as a group.
The typical attention network model contains the following elements:
A set of agents, each of which: observes some information from the environment, may choose to transmit (at a cost) information to other agents, and may choose to receive (at a cost) information from other agents.
A set of tasks, which must be allocated to agents, who must make decisions on the basis of information that is available to them. Section 5 concludes by providing a short discussion of the empirical literature on attention networks, a fast-growing …eld thanks to the increasing availability of data on behavior within organizations.
The Role of Attention Networks within Organizations
We discuss attention networks in the context of the Dessein and Santos (2006; hereafter DS) model of an organization, in which multiple specialized agents work together and must coordinate their individual tasks. Coordination is made di¢ cult by the need to adapt those tasks to a changing environment. We will use the DS model to study endogenous attention networks in organizations. Attention networks facilitate coordinated adaptation to a changing environment. Since organizational attention is scarce, attention networks are optimized to make optimal use of this scarce resource. Since attention is naturally modelled as a communication process, we will use the terms attention and communication interchangeably.
The Dessein-Santos Model
Production in DS requires the combination of n tasks, each performed by one agent i 2 N = f1; 2; :::; ng. The pro…ts of the organization depend on (i) how well each task is adapted to the organizational environment and (ii) how well each task is coordinated with the other tasks.
For this purpose, agent i must take a primary action, a ii 2 R, and a coordinating action,
Pay-o¤ s.-Ideally, agent i 2 N should set his primary action a ii as close as possible to local information i , a random variable with variance 2 and mean^ i . One can interpret^ i as the status quo or the 'standard operation procedure' (SOP) for task i; where we assume that^ i is known to all agents: 4 In contrast, only agent i observes i : We refer to i as the local information pertaining to task i and assume its realization is independent across tasks.
Agent j 6 = i; in turn, should set the coordinating action a ji as close as possible to action a ii :
The expected misadapation and miscoordination losses to the organization then amount to
where is the weight given to misadaptation and the weight given to miscoordination.
The parameter > 0 can be interpreted as measuring task-interdependence. We take a team-theoretic perspective so that all agents choose their primary and coordinating actions in order to minimize expected coordination and adaptation losses, as captured by :
Communication and Timing.-Agents send a message to each other about their primary action. Communication is assumed to be imperfect: Agent i's message is received and understood by agent j with probability p i ; while agent j learns nothing with probability 1 p i : The timing of the game is assumed as follows. In stage 1, agent i 2 N observes i , chooses a ii and communicates it to all agents j 6 = i: In stage 2; agent j receives agent i 0 s message with probability p i and sets a ji = a ii when he learns the value of a ii and sets a ji = E(a ii ) =^ i otherwise.
It follows that agent
where we verify that, indeed, E(a ii ) =^ i
Communication frictions and coordination-adaptation trade-o¤ s. Note that if agent i can perfectly communicate his primary action to agent j; there is no trade-o¤ between adaptation and coordination: agent i then optimally sets a ii = i and agent j 6 = i ensures coordination by setting a ji = a ii : In the presence of communication frictions, however, adaptation-coordination trade-o¤s arise. Indeed, assume p i = 0 so that agent j receives no information about a ii and therefore sets a ji =^ i . Then the more agent i adapts a ii to i the larger are the coordination costs with tasks j 6 = i. By ignoring his local information i and sticking to the standard operating procedure or the status quo a ii =^ i ; however, agent i can ensure perfect coordination 4 We endogenize the quality and precision of standard operating procedures in section 2.2.
with tasks j 6 = i: The ratio
can be interpreted as the optimal degree of adaptiveness or discretion for agent i given the need for coordination and the quality of communication p i :
Substituting the equilibrium choices for primary and coordinating actions given communication frictions p i for tasks i 2 N yields expected losses
Note that equilibrium costs are increasing in the variance 2 (unexpected contingencies, change in the environment), the importance of adaptation as measured by ; the importance of coordination ; as well as the division of labor n: In contrast, equilibrium losses are decreasing in the quality of communication p i between agents.
As pointed out by DS, extensive specialization results in organizations that are increasingly in ‡exible and ignore local knowledge: from (2), a ii is less correlated with i as n increases. As DS show, the division of labor within organizations is therefore limited by the need for adaptation. We refer to DS for a study and analysis of the optimal degree of specialization in organizations. In particular, DS allows each agent to undertake several tasks in the production process, where a broader task-allocation improves coordination but reduces the gains from specialization. In the remainder of this chapter, we will take both the number of tasks n and the task-specialization of agents as given.
Attention Networks versus Standard Operating Procedures.
We now extend the DS model to highlight two very distinctive ways of coordinating economic 1. The organization lives for two periods. The local information in the …rst period, denoted by i;1 ; is normally distributed with mean^ i and variance 2 : The local information in the second period; i;2 ; has a mean^ i + " and variance 2 ; where " is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 " : The variance 2 " then re ‡ects the amount of environmental change or turbulence there is in the environment.
2. Agent j does not observe the mean^ i directly, but knows that the mean^ i itself is a random variable with mean 0 and variance^ 2 > 2 " : At at a cost F S per task; a headquarter manager can learn^ i in the …rst period and (perfectly) communicate it to the organization: The role of headquarters is thus to establish or improve standard operating procedures for each task and communicate those to the organization. 5 We denote d S = 1 when the …rm establishes standard operating procedures for each task so that all agents observe^ i for i 2 N , and d S = 0 otherwise. Abusing notation, we denote expected losses over two periods given investment choices
5 To simplify the analysis, we assume that headquarters only can establish operating procedures in the …rst period. If 2 " is large and FS is small, however, it may be optimal to update operating procedures in the second period.
We distinguish between four cases.
The organization invests both in establishing a high-functioning communication network and establishing standard operating procedures. This case is almost identical to the benchmark DS model, except that the variance of the local information in the second period is given by 2 + 2 " rather than 2 : Expected losses to the organization over the two periods are given by
There is no communication between agents and no standard operating procedures are established. From the perspective of agent j; the random variable i;1 has a mean 0 and variance^ 2 + 2 ; the random variable i;1 has a mean 0 and variancê
: Expected adaptation and coordination losses are given by
Case 3:
There is no communication between agents, but there are standard operating procedures. From the perspective of agent j; the random variable i;1 has a mean i and variance 2 ; the random variable i;2 has a mean^ i and variance 2 + 2 " : Expected losses to the organization are given by
The …rm invests in a communication network but not in standard operating procedures. From the perspective of agent j; the random variable i;1 has a mean 0 and variance 2 : If communication was not successful in the …rst period, the random variable i;2 has a mean 0 and variance 2 + 2 " in the second period. If communication was successful in the …rst period, we assume wlog that also the mean^ i is known to agent j; so that information about i;1 is also informative about i;2 . Expected losses to the organization are given by
Fixing d C 2 f0; 1g ; the bene…ts of investing in standard operating procedures
It now easy to show that (
is not a¤ected by changes in 2 ; 2 " and F C and is decreasing in p H : Hence, an increase in 2 ; 2 " ; F C or p H makes investing in communication networks more attractive, whereas it does not a¤ect or decreases the bene…ts of investing in standard operating procedures. Intuitively, 2 re ‡ects local information held by agent i which is not captured in high-quality operating procedures, whereas 2 " re ‡ects how quickly operating procedures become obsolete. Both therefore make communication networks more valuable. 6 Standard operating procedures are further less valuable as the communication quality p H improves, as SOPs are only useful in case communication fails.
The following proposition follows directly from the above observations: 7 6 Note, however, that an increase in^ 2 ; that is the variance of the optimal standard operating procedures both makes standard operating procedures and communication networks more attractive. Since attention networks and SOPs are substitutes, the comparative statics with respect to^ 2 are ambiguous. 7 Our results are similar to those obtained in Aoki (1986) (iii) the cost of implementing high-quality standard operating procedures, F S ; is higher. (ii) A decrease in the cost of establishing standard operating procedures F S can result in a change from d C = 1 to d C = 0; but never the other way around.
3 Organizational Focus: Convexities in Attention Networks.
In the previous section, it was assumed that communication networks are symmetric -all agents observe or learn each other's actions with the same probability p: Drawing upon Dessein, Galeotti and Santos (2014, DGS hereafter), we now relax the assumption that communication networks are symmetric, that is we allow for p i 6 = p j and let an organization designer optimize over [p i ; :::; p n ]: Our starting point is that organizational attention is scarce, and communication networks optimally distribute this attention among the agents of the organization. We show that even in a symmetric environment where all agents are ex ante identical, optimal attention networks and information ‡ows are often asymmetric ex post because of the complementarity between attention and decision-making. In particular, when organizational attention is scarce, a hybrid approach to coordinating economic activity is optimal where attention networks coordinate the tasks of a select number of agents and the remaining tasks are coordinated using standard operating procedures. Scarce attention thus creates convexities in the optimal allocation of attention, where all attention is (optimally) monopolized by a few agents. We …rst discuss this result in our baseline model and then discuss the robustness of our results to alternative communication technologies.
Baseline Model
Our starting point is that p i -the quality of the communication about agent i 0 s action -is increasing in the organizational attention t i devoted to agent i. Organizational attention is scarce, however, in that there is a …xed attention budget:
the maximum communication quality that can be achieved by focussing all organizational attention on one agent, the organizational attention constraint
At stage 0; an organization designer then optimally chooses [p 1 ; :::; p n ] subject to constraint (4), which will be binding at the optimum.
Two tasks, two agents. Assume now …rst that n = 2; so that the organization consists of two agents and (4) is equivalent to (1 p 1 )(1 p 2 ) 1 P: In order to increase the communication quality p 1 , the organization then needs to reduce the communication quality p 2 : The larger is the maximal communication probability P; the less there is a trade-o¤ between good communication on task 1 versus task 2: Note that P will be large when attention is not scarce and/or tasks are not very complex.
Given that all agents are ex ante symmetric, all tasks are equally important, and interdependencies are symmetric, one may conjecture that the optimal communication network will be symmetric as well. Moreover, it is easy to verify that given constraint (4), p 1 + p 2 is uniquely maximized when p 1 = p 2 : DSG show, however, that when organizational attention is scarce, that is whenever P < P , it is optimal to focus all attention on one of the two agents that is (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 f(P; 0); (0; P g : Intuitively, having a high-quality communication link to agent i and letting agent i be very adaptive to his local information are complementary choices. The more agent i is adaptive to his local information, the less valuable are standard operating procedures in coordinating tasks, and the more important is communication to achieve coordination. More attention should therefore be focused on agent i: By the same token, it agent i is not responsive to his local information, then it is a waste of time to devote attention to agent i; as coordination is achieved appropriately by the common knowledge and adherence to standard operating procedures.
Assume that equilibrium primary actions are linear in i and^ i ; that is
where i can be interpreted as the adaptiveness (or discretion) of agent i: Substituting a ii in
(1) and taking expectations, expected losses equal
Inspecting (5); it is immediate that 1 and p 1 are complementary choices. The more adaptive is agent 1; the larger are the bene…ts of improving communication about agent 1 in order to minimize : If we had chosen an attention constraint with a constant rate of substitution between p 1 and p 2 , for example p 1 + p 2 P; then it would always be optimal to focus all attention on one agent so that either p 1 = 0 or p 2 = 0: More naturally, however, there are decreasing marginal returns to attention, as captured by the constraint (4). Indeed, from (4), the higher is p 1 , the more one needs to reduce p 2 for any additional increase in p 1 . Such decreasing marginal returns create a countervailing force against focussing all attention on the same task. The following proposition, taken directly from DSG, shows that an asymmetric attention networks is optimal if and only if attention is scarce:
There exists a P ( ) such that:
(i) An asymmetric (focused) attention network is optimal, (p 1 ; p 2 ) 2 f(P; 0); (0; P )g if and only if P P ( ) (ii) A symmetric (balanced) attention network is optimal, (p 1 ; p 2 ) = (p;p) if and only if P > P ( ) ; where 2 log(1 p) = log(1 P ) (iii) P ( ) is increasing in the importance of coordination, .
To summarize the above proposition, if organizational attention is scarce (T is small) or the environment are very complex ( is small), then P = 1 e T is small as well, and it optimal to focus all attention on one agent, say agent 1. Agent 1 is then allowed to be very adaptive to his task, and coordination with agent 1 will be achieved through the attention network. In contrast, agent 2 will be forced to largely ignore his local information and coordination with this agent's tasks will be achieved through adherence to the commonly known standard operating procedure,^ 2 :
If, on the other hand, organizational attention is abundant (T is large) or the environment is not very complex ( is large), then P will be large, and it will be optimal to have a symmetric attention network where both agents divide attention equally. Intuitively, it is then feasible for each agent to communicate his primary action almost perfectly. Both agents can then be responsive to their local information and coordination will be achieved through the attention network for both agents. Standard operating procedures play a limited role in coordinating activity.
Large organizations. DSG extend their set-up to incorporate n > 2 tasks, in which case they
show that the optimal communication network consists of`leaders and n `followers. All attention is equally split among the`leaders, whereas no attention is devoted to the n f ollowers. The`leaders are very responsive to their local information and coordination with their task is achieved through the attention network. In contrast, coordination with the tasks of the n `followers is achieved by letting those agents stick closely the commonly known standard operating procedures. In other words, when attention is scarce, a hybrid approach to coordinating economic activity is optimal. Attention networks coordinate the tasks of a select number of agents and the remaining tasks are coordinated using standard operating procedures. The better the communication technology (the larger is ), the larger is`and the more the organization relies on attention networks rather than standard operating procedures.
In contrast, the more interdependent are tasks, and the more important is the avoidance of coordination losses, the smaller is`and the less the organization relies on networks. 8 8 In DGS, the number of leaders and who is a leader is determined in equilibrium. A number of other papers, such as Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2012), Dessein and Santos (2014) and Van den Steen (2014), also build on DS in order to study how a leader can achieve coordination among members of an organization.
Communication networks are not endogenized, however, as communication is always between the exogenously appointed leader and the remainder of the organization.
Alternative communication technologies.
We now discuss the robustness of our results to alternative communication technologies. Let us denote by m i be the information received by agent j regarding i and de…ne the residual variance about i as Var( i jm i ) E( i E( i jm i )) 2 : In our baseline model, we have assumed that agent j 6 = i observes i with a probability p i = 1 e t i where t i is the attention devoted to task i: Given this communication technology
Substituting (6) into (3), expected organizational losses can be written as :
One can verify that (t) is convex in attention t i when t i is small. As discussed above and shown by DGS, whenever organizational attention is scarce (T < T ); it follows that (t) is maximized by setting t i = T =`for`agents i 2 L N and set t j = 0 for n `agents 
where H( ) is the (di¤erential) entropy of and H( jm) the entropy of conditional upon observing m. In other words, the attention capacity T of the organization puts a constraint on the total reduction in entropy following communication. 9 Given that m i and the conditional distributions F ( i jm i ) are independently normally distributed for i 2 N , attention constraint 
Since (9) and (6) are equivalent up to a rescaling of the attention capacity, we obtain identical results as in our baseline model. Hence, whenever organizational attention T is scarce, normally distributed information and entropy information costs imply that the optimal attention network is asymmetric where a few agents monopolize all attention. 
Sampling from a Normal Distribution
Whereas for t i small, we have that (t) is convex in t i for communication technologies (9) and (6), it is now easy to verify that given communication technology (10), (t) is always concave in t i . Hence, given (10), the optimal allocation of attention is symmetric, that is t i = T =n for all i 2 N . Intuitively, regardless of the communication technology, the complementarity between attention and decision-making results in a convexity in the value of information. Indeed, from (7), (t) is convex in E(Var( i jm i )): Convexities in the cost of communication, however, provide a countervailing force to focus all attention on a few tasks. Indeed, technologies (9), (6) and (10) 9 Formally, this is equivalent with assuming that T is the (Shannon) capacity of the Guassian communication channel. The capacity of a channel is a measure of the maximum data rate that can be reliably transmitted over the channel. Shannon capacity has proven to be an appropriate concept for studying information ‡ows in a variety of disciplines: probability theory, communication theory, computer science, mathematics, statistics, as well as in both portfolio theory and macroeconomics.
(10), however, that this convexity in the cost of communication dominates the convexity in the value of information for any value of t i . In contrast, for technologies (9) and (6), the convexity in the cost of communication only dominates when t i is su¢ ciently large.
In the next section, we study optimal attention networks in more complex environments:
(i) tasks and interdependencies between tasks are asymmetric, (ii) communication has both an active and a passive component, and (iii) agents do not necessarily maximize a common objective function. To simplify the analysis, we will assume that communication costs are su¢ ciently convex, as in technology (10), allowing us to focus on interior solutions. Consider a set of N agents. Each agent i faces a local state of the world:
where s i denotes the precision of i , i.e. s i = 1=V ar ( i ). If the local states were correlated, agents'actions may be correlated in equilibrium even if agents do not communicate. We prefer to abstract from this form of direct correlation in order to focus on the role of communication.
Therefore, we assume that i is independent across agents.
Each agent i observes only i and can then engage in communication with all other agents.
Information transmission requires e¤ort from both the sender and the receiver. The signal is more precise if the sender invests more in active communication (e.g. speaking or writing) and the receiver invests more in passive communication (e.g. listening or reading). Namely, agent i receives message y ij from agent j, such that
where " ij and ij are two normally distributed noise terms
and r ij (resp. p ij ) is the precision of " ij (resp. ij ). We assume that all stochastic terms are mutually independent (and independent of the 's).
In the …rst stage of the game every agent chooses how much to invest in communication.
Namely, agent i selects the values of two vectors: (i) The precision of the active communication part of all the signals he sends: (r ji ) j6 =i , for which he incurs cost k 2 r P j6 =i r ji , where k r 0 is a parameter; (ii) The precision of the passive communication part of all the signals he receives, (p ij ) j6 =i , for which he incurs cost k 2 p P j6 =i p ij , where k p 0 is a parameter (p is mnemonic for passive).
In the second stage of the game, every agent observes the signals he has received from the other agents and chooses the value of action a i 2 ( 1; 1). The payo¤ of agent i is a classic quadratic objective function
CDP can be formulated in three ways
where the term d ii measures the adaptation motive, i.e. the importance of tailoring i's action to the local state, and the term d ij represents the coordination motive, namely the interaction between the action taken by agent i and the action taken by agent j. For the rest of the paper we assume that the interaction terms are positive (d ij 0 for all i and all j).
The game has two versions according to whether investment in communication occurs before or after the agent observes his local state i . The "before" version captures the idea that investment has a long-term component (e.g. two …rms appoint liaison o¢ cers).
The "after" version represents a shorter-term investment, like the direct cost of writing and reading a report. As Calvó. et al (2015) discuss, both versions have the same linear purestrategy equilibrium. For concreteness, in this chapter, we focus on the "before"version. We refer to this game as (D; k; s), where
This can be seen as a game of communication and in ‡uence. In equilibrium, agents communicate with each other and they in ‡uence each other's decisions through the signals they communicate. The analysis of this game is divided in two parts. First, we provide a closed-form characterization of equilibrium. Second, we show that in ‡uence in equilibrium is approximated with an appropriately de…ned notion of eigenvector centrality, which can be computed directly on the interaction matrix D.
Let us begin by characterizing equilibrium play. To do this, consider …rst a game with just two players. First, normalize the interaction matrix of agent i by dividing it by the sum of all interaction terms
The payo¤ -net of communication costs -of, say, agent 1 can now be written as
Focus on the second stage of the game. Given investments in communication, how do agents select their actions as functions of signals they receive. One can check this stage has a linear equilibrium of the following form:
where the b-coe¢ cients solve 
Investment in active and passive communication is not equal. The numerator of the righthand-side of equation (14) 
Provided that the cost of communication parameters k r and k p are su¢ ciently low (to avoid corner solutions), we have:
The game (D; k; s) has a linear equilibrium where:
(i) Decisions are given by
(ii) Active communication is
Theorem 3 is the generalization of the two-agent case. The inverse matrix (I ) 1 , which captures the direct and indirect interactions of agents'actions on one another. It can be understood as an in…nite series of higher-order normalized e¤ects:
Theorem 3 can be seen as one way of formalizing Arrow's (1974) idea that communication and decisions pattern are shaped by the objectives of the members of the organization. Given underlying parameters that describe complementarities, information cost, and uncertainty, we can predict how much each agent will communicate in equilibrium and who much he will be in ‡uenced by other agents.
The second part of the analysis focuses on in ‡uence. Theorem 3 characterizes in ‡uence as a game-theoretic phenomenon. It turns out that this strategic approach is approximately equal to a much simpler network centrality concept.
To see, we need to additional de…nitions. First, de…ne a sequence of games as follows.
Fix D, s, k r and k p , and de…ne the payo¤ function:
where t 2 (0; 1) and > 1. For every value of t we de…ne a di¤erent game, which we can call (D; s; k r ; k p ; t). As t goes to zero, coordination becomes relatively more important than adaptation (and communication costs go down in order to guarantee that the solutions does not run into non-negativity constraints on communication intensities).
For every value of the parameter t, we have a natural de…nition of an agent's in ‡uence as the e¤ect on all agent's actions (including his own) of an increase in his own state. Namely, the global in ‡uence of agent i, that we denote by I i , is and that satis…es P j j = 1. We can show that the game-theoretic in ‡uence index tends to the axiomatic in ‡uence index when t goes to zero: Theorem 4 As t ! 0, the relative global in ‡uence of agents converges to the ratio of eigenvector centrality indices weighted by an adaptation vs coordination ratio. Namely, for any i and j,
In particular, if d ii = d jj and D i = D j for all i; j 2 N , then we obtain that
This result implies that, when t is su¢ ciently small, namely when coordination is more important than adaptation, eigenvector centrality is a good approximation of game-theoretic in ‡uence. This result is useful in practice because eigenvector centrality is easier to compute.
It also creates a conceptual link between equilibrium in ‡uence in organizations and in ‡uence as de…ned in other contexts where eigenvector centrality is often used, such as search engines and bibliometrics.
Conclusions
The three previous sections discussed, respectively, three key …ndings of the theory of attention networks. First, a decentralized attention network or a set of standardized operating procedures are two alternative ways of achieving coordination among members of an organization. The former is more likely to be optimal when local information is more important and communication costs are lower. Second, in ‡uence and communication patterns can be highly asymmetric even starting from a perfectly symmetric interaction function. When attention is scarce, it is optimal for an organization to direct their members'attention to a small set of key agents. Third, in ‡uence and communication patterns within an organization are highly interrelated. If we observe communication patterns -for instance through electronic records -we can use eigenvector centrality to rank the in ‡uence of the members of the organization.
The rest of this section discusses two promising applications of the endogenous communication network framework. We …rst discuss empirical analyses and we then move to models that combine endogenous communication and behavioral biases. Makarov (2011), …nally, studies an organization where employees display present-bias preferences and communication (e.g. email) can be high-priority or low-priority. In equilibrium, the organization su¤ers from social procrastination as agents spend excessive time on low-priority communication. In this setting, the organization may bene…t from policies that restrict communication.
